



# Appeal for Immediate Food Needs and Scenarios of Likely Emergency Needs in 2003

**Ethiopia**  
**30 September 2002**


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## **1. Executive Summary**

This report provides the outcome of a recently conducted DPPC- led multi agency assessments of the 2002 mid-*Meher* season. The assessment was conducted between 15<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of August and UN agencies, donor representatives and NGOs were involved. The objective of the assessment was to assess the impact of the failure of the preceding *Belg* season rains and late start of this *Kiremt* rains on production and food security between October and December and build up scenarios of the likely emergency needs in 2003 for the purpose of contingency planning. The Conclusions presented in this appeal are supported by the United Nations.

In July 2002, the Government of Ethiopia Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), based on the findings of a multi-agency needs assessment, issued an appeal for food assistance due to severe drought in the pastoral areas and failure of *Belg* (short season) rains in cropping areas.

At that time, due to the failure of *Belg* rains during April/May and its impact on planting and early development of maize and sorghum, the DPPC indicated an increasingly worrying situation. As maize and sorghum comprise 40% of national production and are major staple foods of the rural community, any delay or decline in the harvest means inevitable suffering resulting from an extended lean season. Unfortunately, the concerns have proven justified.



As predicted, the failure of *Belg* rains and the late onset of the *Kiremt* rains at the end of July and in some cases August have caused widespread long cycle crop losses at an early stage and further reduced pasture and water resources, the latter causing extensive livestock deaths in affected areas and poor physical condition for surviving animals. This situation has in turn severely limited access to a green harvest of maize and sorghum, important lean season foods, and availability of livestock products.

As a result of the dry conditions, serious food shortages are reported in several parts of the country leading to additional food assistance requirements from October to December 2002. A recent multi-agency mid-*Meher* season assessment estimated that between October and December, the people in need of immediate assistance will peak at 6.3 million people. As it now stands, the relief food requirement between October and December is estimated to be 273,000 MT, which includes approximately 245,000 MT of cereals, 21,000 MT of famix and 7,000 MT of oil. At present there is only 100,000 tons of confirmed pledges from the US and 5000 tons from China Governments available to meet the assessed needs. In addition a pledge of one million EURO is confirmed from German Government through WFP. A contribution of 15,000 MT of food from Sweden Government is also under process.

**Table 1. Summary of Immediate Food Needs October to December 2002**

Month	Population Requiring Assistance		Food Requirement in Mt			
	Previous est.	Present est.	Cereal	Famix	Oil	Total
October	3,074,395	6,261,842	93,928	6,979	2,326	103,233
November	2,540,926	5,605,973	84,090	6,979	2,326	93,395
December	1,707,520	4,473,064	67,096	6,979	2,326	76,401
Total	-	-	245,114	20,937	6,978	273,029

Meeting food needs for the remainder of 2002 is critical for the containment of a highly volatile situation from which the slightest departure from planned assistance schedules or interruption in delivery of basic and supplementary food will result in a rapid deterioration in nutritional status, as has been witnessed in Afar Region, in Shinile and Fik Zones of Somali Region and in West Hararhe Zone of Oromiya Region.

While it is important to highlight that the needs arising from the current drought cross all sectors (water, health, agriculture and livestock), and that response to them is inherently important to life saving and sustaining interventions, the single most prominent and demanding need - and the one for which resources must be mobilised well in advance for logistics and allocation reasons - is for food.

The impact of the current drought is expected to go beyond the immediate needs for October to December 2002, as its impact on the food security status of the population in 2003 will be significant. As a result of the extended dry spell between *Belg* and *Kiremt* rains, there have been widespread failures of long cycle crops in most mid and lowland parts of the northern, central, eastern and southern parts of the country. Through efforts on the part of Government, NGO's and the farmers themselves, some seeds were distributed and failed crops were replanted with low yielding short maturing crops like teff, barley and pulses. In addition, late Kiremt rainfall has affected the surplus producing areas in the west resulting in the late planting of long cycle crops. Successful harvest of short cycle crops in affected areas as well as long cycle crops in the west will largely depend on rains extending beyond their normal cessation time.

The implication of a significant decline in average *Meher* crop production is not to be dismissed. Unlike recent crises in Ethiopia that affected mainly *Belg* dependent and pastoralist this crisis will have an impact on many more Ethiopians. Approximately 75% of the population in Ethiopia rely on their own *Meher* harvest for the majority of their cereal consumption and the remaining

population relies on purchase of this harvest. Significant reductions in the *Meher* harvest and subsequent increases in prices will thus affect the majority of the population in one way or another.

Working with three scenarios, multi-agency needs assessment teams prepared contingency plans for 2003. While it is difficult to project the exact number of beneficiaries at this time for 2003, the teams attempted to forecast needs given three scenarios (best, mid and worst case). The scenarios used to project potential food and income shortfalls in 2003 were, given the late onset of *Kiremt* rains are as follow:

- in the worse case, erratic rains would continue and withdraw early,
- in the mid case, rains would return to normal in terms of distribution and cessation, and
- in the best case, rains would end after normal cessation dates, i.e. mid September in the north and gradually withdrawing through to the mid October in the south.

It is important to remember that these are *contingency planning* scenarios. In an effort to avoid a crisis precipitated by a potential lack of resources in early 2003, it is important to sensitise stakeholders as to the potential requirements for next year with an emphasis on the first three months. These figures will be reassessed and updated by rapid multi-agency assessment in October and final harvest assessment in December, complemented by the MoA/FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission.

**Table 2. Scenarios of the likely emergency needs in 2003**

Scenarios	General Ration		Supplementary Food		
	Beneficiaries	Cereals (MT)	Vulnerable Groups	Veg Oil (MT)	CSB (MT)
<b>Best Case</b>	6.8 million	850,450	1.7 million	21,521	64,563
<b>Mid Case</b>	10.2 million	1,341,182	2.5 million	33,670	101,010
<b>Worst Case</b>	14.3 million	1,991,940	3.2 million	46,171	138,513

Early shipment of food aid for 2003 first quarter needs is imperative to compensate for the inevitable delay between a pledge and its availability for distribution. First quarter of 2003 contingency plans for cereals only are as follows:

- Best case scenario about 211,000 metric tons,
- Mid case scenario about 343,000 metric tons,
- Worse Case Scenario over 500,000 metric tons.

## **2. Major Mid-Meher Assessment Findings**

### **2.1. National Overview**

Between February and May 2002, Ethiopia experienced a near total failure of *Belg* (short) rains and early withdrawal of rains in most parts of the country. *Kiremt* (long) rains were delayed by up to six weeks, prolonging the normally short dry season to up to three months. The erratic nature of rains has had a detrimental effect on crop production, of which more than 97% is rain-fed.

The failure of *Belg* and the subsequent inadequacy of *Kiremt* rains in pastoral Afar and northern Shinile led to the rapid deterioration of conditions including the death of livestock and shortly thereafter the increase in malnutrition among children under five.

In crop dependent areas, while the early cessation of *Belg* rains had an impact on the land preparation for long cycle crops grown during the main *Meher* season, the delay in the onset of *Kiremt* rains caused delays in planting. The immediate result was the absence of a green harvest

between August and September and an expected delay in the main harvest by one to two months. Populations dependent on subsistence farming are presently experiencing an extended lean season. In areas that are chronically food insecure, this has resulted in a rapid deterioration in nutritional status.

Potentially even more disastrous, the extended dry spell resulted in the complete failure of high yielding long cycle crops, specifically along the eastern escarpment in Tigray and Amhara and the lowlands of East and West Haraghe, Arsi, Bale in Oromiya Region and in the Rift Valley of SNNPR. Particularly affected are sorghum and maize, staple foods for many of the rural poor, which together account for approximately 40% of total cereal production in Ethiopia.

Due to either the complete failure of crops or the substitution of long cycle crops for lower yielding short cycle crops, the harvest in November/December will only bring short term relief to food insecurity. Further more the significant reduction in coffee prices has also caused for many people to be dependant on food aid in areas where it was self sufficient. Therefore, food insecurity in Ethiopia in 2003 is expected to be significantly worse than average.

## **2.2. Regional Overview**

### **2.2.1. Afar Region**

Afar is an entirely pastoral region with the exception of some irrigated agriculture schemes producing cotton and cereals (Amibara, Dubti, Assaita) and recession agriculture practiced along the Awash riverbed.

The *Belg (sugum)* rains were a complete failure causing widespread losses of livestock, with mortality rates as high as 70% in Zone 3. Early migration of livestock in already poor condition to the northeastern highlands of Amhara and Tigray caused further distress and deaths. With the loss of livestock products for consumption or sale, populations reported relying largely on the collection of wild foods and food aid. The impact of livestock morbidity and mortality was felt most acutely by under 5 children with more than 70% of households reporting no milk for their children. Nutritional surveys conducted in August in some localities of Zone 1 and 3 of Afar region indicated that malnutrition rates range from 18 to 32%.

Bringing some relief, the *Kiremt (karma)* rains started in late July. Unfortunately the mainly sporadic and erratic showers did not restore pasture and water supplies to normal levels. Zone 2 received few days rainfall. The remaining livestock are still in poor condition, rendering them susceptible to endemic diseases. Recent reports indicate that in search of better conditions, Afar pastoralists are once again migrating to the highlands of Amhara, competing for resources and risking spread of livestock disease across regional borders.

This year, the region experienced its worst disaster in the last decade for what concerns Afar livelihood asset depletion, animal death and water shortage.

### **2.2.2. Amhara Region**

Severely affected parts of Amhara Region can be divided into the eastern escarpment of North and South Wollo, Oromiya and North Shewa bordering Afar Region, the lowland gorges bordering rivers in East Gojjam and South Gonder and the lowlands of Wag Hamra. These areas have been most affected by poor rainfall, particularly the late onset of the *Kiremt* rains by up to 6

weeks. Zikuala woreda in Wag Hamra Zone is one of the most severely hit areas of the region with only for few days of rain recorded since the supposed onset of the *Kiremt* season in June.

Late onset of *Kiremt* rains severely compromised land preparation for the *Meher* season in affected areas. The poor condition of livestock after the extended dry spell resulted in weak animals and hence inadequate ploughing. When long cycle crops failed along the eastern escarpment in North and South Wollo, Oromiya and North Shewa Zones, and the Tekeze and Abay Gorges in North Gonder and East Gojjam Zones respectively, most farmers were forced to shift from long cycle to short cycle crops. Indicative of the impact in Amhara Region, long cycle crops such as maize and sorghum average 17-20 Qt/ha while a short cycle crop such as teff or short cycle sorghum averages 9-10 Qt/ha. While maize and sorghum comprise between 25 and 45% of total crops in North and South Wollo and North and South Gonder, it is grown largely in lowland areas that have been most affected by the drought, including Oromiya Zone where maize and sorghum make up more than 80% of total crop production.

According to the field reports, large reduction in input use, as much as 50% in South Gonder and East Gojjam and 30-40% in North Shewa is expected to result in significant production reduction. In addition to anticipating less than average production due to reduced yields from short cycle crops and reduced inputs, this production is still dependent on rains continuing until end September/early October.

In the western midlands and highlands (West and East Gojjam, North and South Gonder), long cycle crops were planted up to one month late. While crop conditions are relatively good, average or slightly below average production will only be obtained if rains extend past their usual cessation date into late September.

Other sources of income such as livestock have also been affected. In Jille Timuga, Oromiya, Bureau of Agriculture (BoA) reported a loss of more than 50,000 cattle, in part due to the dramatic increase in diseases presumably as a result of contact with infected livestock from Afar. Other quantitative data provided by BoA in North Wollo, Wag Hamra and North Shewa indicated livestock deaths numbering nearly 30,000 largely in woredas bordering Afar. Unable to produce crops or raise livestock, the numbers of people in Wag Hamra looking for wage labour has increased, causing the price to decline from 57 birr/day to 3-5 birr/day. With cereals selling at 2 birr/kg, wage labor alone is insufficient to sustain a family..

The immediate effect of delayed rains has been an extended lean season. An unusual and unacceptable decline in nutritional status has already been measured among chronically food insecure populations. Nutritional surveys conducted in July and August by various agencies indicated that 13 and 17% Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) in some localities of West Belessa, North Gonder and Dessie Zuria in South Wollo respectively.

### **2.2.3. Harari Region and Dire Dawa Administration**

Harari Region and Dire Dawa Administration, adjacent to hard-hit Shinile Zone, Somali Region and East Haraghe Zone, Oromiya Region, are facing similar conditions with only slightly better conditions in Dire Dawa due to more regular *Kiremt* rains.

Similar to Haraghe, in Harari, the lowland areas are worse affected with anticipated production declines of 30% in the midlands and 35 to 40% in the lowland areas even if rains last until the end of September. Already 20% of maize has been lost but replanted with the assistance of seeds distributed by NGOs. According to assessment teams, while sorghum is normally at head formation stage in August, this year only the April planted sorghum was at near head formation (40% of the plots) and those planted in June were above knee height (60% of the plots). Pulses and wheat were planted on time and were at the leafy stage. In Dire Dawa, the area planted is 22% less than the long-term average. While sorghum planted in April was at near head formation

(20%), sorghum planted in June is only knee height (55%). A significant percentage of crops was planted in August and was at germination stage at the time of the assessment (25%). Crops planted in June and August will only be harvested in December and February respectively. The extension of the rain into October, beyond its normal cessation date, is essential for near average production.

Market conditions indicate an increase in negative coping mechanisms being employed by food insecure communities. Charcoal and firewood sales have become the major source of income, destroying already badly depleted forest resources. This year, the supply in the market is much higher resulting in lower prices.

#### **2.2.4. Oromiya Region**

Oromiya is the largest region in the country and possesses a variety of agro-ecological climates. The region produces 50% and 38% of the country's maize and sorghum respectively. However this year, maize and sorghum production in Arsi, Bale, East Shewa, East and West Haraghe is anticipated to be substantially below normal. In East and West Haraghe, maize production is anticipated to be less than 10% of average.

Regarding rainfall, the eastern half of Oromiya, specifically the lowlands bordering Afar and Somali Regions, experienced the near total failure of *Belg* rains resulting in appeals for assistance as early as July. Subsequently, these same areas suffered from the late start of the *Kiremt* rains creating dry spells of up to three months. With rains having finally started in August, as of September these areas had received less amounts of precipitation than normal in the *Meher* season (25 to 50% below normal).

For pastoralists living in East Shewa bordering Afar Region, poor rains from February to May resulted in livestock deaths comparable to those in bordering Afar Region. Losses of livestock reported in household surveys in some areas were 40 to 50%. West Hararghe also quantified livestock losses at over 13,000. For crop dependent populations, the majority of the long cycle maize and sorghum crops in the eastern (West and East Hararghe) and central (Arsi, Bale and East Shewa) zones of Oromiya Region failed due to moisture stress and absence of rainfall during crucial flowering stages. In East and West Hararghe, where maize and sorghum accounts for nearly 90% of total cereal production, the implication on food security is critical. Teams estimated that if rains end before October, maize losses would be 90% in the lowlands and 60% in the mid and highlands. However, even with rains extending into October, a month longer than their normal withdrawal date, West Hararghe would hardly benefit at all with production losses projected at an estimated 85% in the lowlands and 50% in the mid and highlands. The assessment team of East Shewa reported losses of 75% sorghum and 80% maize.

In the lowlands of West Hararghe and East Shewa, the most severely affected areas, the nutritional situation deteriorated rapidly when green harvests of maize and livestock products such as milk were not available. Nutrition surveys in East Shewa (July) indicate malnutrition rates of 13% among under 5 yrs and as high as 17% in children under 29 months..

In the affected areas, absence of *Kiremt* rains failed to provide adequate conditions for replanting short cycle cereals (wheat, barley, teff) or planting of pulses in June/July. With the onset of rains in late August, subsistence farmers began to plant but face the inevitable delays in harvest and an extension of the lean season until December. Even then, a harvest in December depends on extended rains until mid October.

Similar to West Hararghe and East Shewa Zones, East Hararghe, the mid to lowlands in southern Bale, and pocket areas in Arsi Zone, declines in maize and sorghum are anticipated. However, in North Shewa where maize and sorghum account for 10-20% of cereal production and the crops

completely failed, farmers replanted with wheat and teff, less yielding short cycle crops. Teams estimate declines in total *Meher* production in North Shewa around 35%. In the mid and highlands of Arsi, Bale, North and Northwest Shewa, wheat and barley, which comprise approximately 65% of total crop production in these zones, crops are less affected.

In the western zones of the region (West and East Wellega, Jimma, and Illubabor), the *Kiremt* rains were late but have since been adequate in distribution. These Zones are less affected.

Prices have steeply increased in the last 6 months in the region. However, in Arsi, Borena, and North Shewa, while prices are higher than last year, they are not yet as high as 2000. Other sources of income are also affected by price fluctuations. Livestock in Borena have increased in sales, driving prices downward. Prices of coffee remain extremely low on both national and international markets.

### **2.2.5. Southern Nations Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR)**

The Southern Nations Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR) is composed of zones with considerable fluctuation in agro-ecological climates. These agro-ecological belts vary from: 1) fertile highlands with one annual growth season from June to November, 2) midland areas in the north and east with two growing seasons from February to June and July/August to November, and 3) agro-pastoral lowlands in the southwest of the region. By definition, *Belg* crops are those harvested before August therefore much of SNNPR is characterised as *Belg* dependent. During the main *Belg* planting season from February to June, farmers usually plant long cycle cereals and sweet potatoes..

While the onset of the *Belg* rainfall was either on time or only slightly delayed in the majority of the region (February), enabling timely land preparation, planting and germination, the complete absence of rainfall from mid-May to end-August in the lowlands resulted a near total failure of the maize crops there. Particularly hard hit areas were Wolayta, Gamogofa, Gurage, Silti,Alaba, KT and Sidama Zones.

Given the *Belg* failure, lowland farmers attempted to compensate for earlier losses by increasing area coverage and production of *Meher* crop, replowing fields prior to the *Belg* harvest, intercropping and planting of pulses. On the other hand, *Meher* production in some midlands and highlands account up to 70% of annual production. However, below normal *Kiremt* rains in July and August are also jeopardizing this production. Rainfall gauge data indicate that in August in Arba Minch, Kebri Mengist, and Konso, rainfall was only 24%, 10%, 17% of normal, respectively. Satellite imagery confirms rainfall gauge data with the area showing the lowlands of the Rift Valley receiving less than 25% of normal rainfall for the June-August period and the mid and highlands receiving 25 to 50% of normal rainfall.

Extended rainfall in October is imperative to ensure adequate production of crops planted in August/September. If rains withdraw at their normal time (September), production in Wolayta and Gamogofa, already suffering from particularly poor *Belg* production, can expect a 40% reduction on *Meher* crops.

Market prices in the region have been steadily increasing since March, surpassing 2001 levels, but remaining at or slightly below 2000 levels. Given the extended dry season from April to August, livestock are in very poor condition. Terms of trade between livestock and cereals continue to disfavor livestock owners.

## 2.2.6. Somali Region

Somali Region is still recovering from a devastating drought in 1999/2000. This year, *Belg (gu)* rains were normal in the southern part of the region. While pastoralists living in the northern part of the region adjacent to Afar (Shinile Zone), as well as those adjacent to East and West Haraghe (Fik Zone) have received much lower than average rains resulting in unseasonal declines in water and pasture for livestock.

In Shinile, poor rains in April/May resulted in inadequate pasture and water for pastoralists. Migration in search of better resources north into Afar Region resulted in clan conflicts between the Afar and Somalis in some areas. Unable to find means to save their livestock, deaths were reported in the western parts of the zone.

It was hoped that the *Kiremt (karan)* rains in Shinile would alleviate poor conditions. However, rains have been poorly distributed and the food security situation has not improved. Pasture remains critically low in Shinile Zone and livestock pressure is high in areas where livestock have crowded.

With poor *Belg (gu)* rains in Fik, what would normally be a short dry season has been extended and the situation remains precarious. Pasture is scarce in Fik Zone and livestock have moved as far as Jijiga and Gode for water. With relatively better rainfall in Jijiga, pasture and water conditions have improved.

In Shinile zone, cereal prices remained higher than normal due to poor crop production in nearby areas and livestock prices declined due to the poor condition of animals. ..

The food security situation in Shinile Zone is generally very poor and, given that in late September the six-month long dry season will set in, the outlook is very bleak. While the immediate situation in both Zones is critical, Fik Zone should benefit from October/November rains, which need to be carefully monitored, hopefully alleviating the situation there.

## 2.2.7. Tigray Region

In Eastern and Southern Zones conditions are similar to North/South Wollo and Oromiya Zones in Amhara, along the eastern escarpment bordering Afar, and received similar if not worse *Kiremt* rains. The *Kiremt* rains (June-August) were one month late and the quantity of rainfall received in the Eastern and Southern Zones was more than 50% below normal while in Central Zones, between 50% and 25% below normal.

Both the delays and poor amount of rainfall have adversely affected the agricultural cycle. In both seasons, land preparation and planting processes were hampered. Along the eastern escarpment, there was widespread substitution of maize (normally 32-42% of total cereal crop in Central and Southern Tigray) with short cycle crops. Not only has the area cultivated for long cycle crops shown a significant decline (25%) this year compared to the 5-year average and last year (15%), but there has been a significant decrease in fertilizer use (60%) compared to the 5-year average (1997-2001) in Central and Eastern Tigray.

Farmers and woreda experts reported that most of the crops were planted late and in order to get a reasonable harvest rainfall must extend up to the September/October. Most of the crops will be at flowering and seed setting stage after mid-September; at this stage of development moisture will be critical. However, this means that rains must extend beyond their normal cessation time.

Shortage of rainfall, and the resulting lack of pasture and drinking water, has also impacted the physical condition of livestock, making them also more susceptible to disease. In lowland areas,

where livestock represent an important part of the population's livelihood, out-migration to neighboring woredas was reported. More than 20,000 cattle deaths were reported in South Tigray and 60 to 70% of livestock were still in poor to very poor condition. Poor production prospects have resulted in cereal price hikes, not only higher than 2001 but higher than 2000, a crisis year, which combined with the increase of livestock sales at depressed prices, generated unfavorable terms of trade for the rural population.

### **2.2.8. Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz Regions**

The Gambella lowlands are a complex economy and not entirely dependent on their own crop production but dependent largely on cereal imports from the highlands and livestock sales. Therefore, while the late rains have had some impact on crop production, the food security situation in the region is not precarious at this time. Much will depend on how the rains progress not only in Gambella itself but also in the highlands.

While rains started late throughout Gambella, Zone 3, where populations are largely pastoral, and western Zone 2 are worst affected. River levels of the Akobo, Gillo and Baro rivers, which depend on rains from the highlands, were also substantially below normal at the end of August. This will adversely affect recessional agriculture, which is also very important to Gambella as perennial rivers normally overflow in July and August and recede in September or October.

At the moment, maize is found at two growth stages. Either it was planted in April/May and has undergone moisture stress during germination stage, and, if it survives, will have expected yields well below average, or maize and sorghum was planted late and is in good condition, even if late in the phenological stage. If rains last until end September, a harvest can be expected. Livestock condition, pasture and water availability at present are good. While some disease outbreaks have been reported, the numbers are not of epidemic proportions.

As a green harvest is available, it is unlikely the region will require assistance as a result of drought before December. Depending on the cessation of the rains in the mid and highlands, the amount of river overflow and therefore opportunities for recessional agriculture, it is moderately likely that the region will need some assistance in 2003.

Similar to Gambella, in Benshangul Gumuz, the rains started up to 6 weeks late. The delayed onset of the rains resulted in late planting of maize and sorghum (70% of total cereal production). This forced farmers to switch from these usual long cycle crops to less productive crops like sesame, niger seed and haricot beans. Even so, the harvest depends on rains extending into November, well beyond their normal cessation time. Significant damage has also been incurred since July due to rodent infestation, heavily damaging maize and haricot bean crops.

## **3. Immediate Food Needs from October to December**

Similar to 1999, relief requirements for the last quarter of the year 2002 (October to December) have increased. In 1999, after increasing from 2.2 million people at the beginning of the year, needs increased to 5.0 million in July, 6.6 million in October, and peaked in crisis conditions in 2000 when 10.2 million people required assistance. In 2002, after appealing for 5.2 million in January, needs increased to 5.9 million in July after April/May rains failed. Due to the delayed onset of *Kiremt* rains in July/August and therefore extended lean season, the needs have increased to 6.3 million for the period October to December 2002.

Factors leading to these increased food needs at the end of the year are:

- Remarkable losses of livestock products in pastoral areas where rains continue to be insufficient and livestock have not recovered.

- The absence of root crops, vegetables, early and green harvests in hardest hit areas, which are usually consumed as a lean season food.
- Decline of household income due to death of large number of livestock and poor physical condition and low prices of cash crops like coffee.

All of these factors have meant at the minimum, asset depletion, if not actually a deterioration in nutritional status, leading to further dependence on food aid at this time.

**Table 3: Population Needing Immediate Assistance and Cereal Food Requirement from October to December 2002 by Region**

Region	2002 Belg Season	2001 Meher Season	Additional 2002 Meher season	Total Needy Population	Total Cereal Requirement (MT)
Afar	448,500	-	45,250	493,750	22,223
Amhara	172,900	372,700	779,600	1,325,200	36,534
B Gumuz	-	-	-	-	-
Dire Daw	31,800	-	21,800	53,600	2,412
Gambella	-	-	-	-	-
Harari	-	13,000	6,000	19,000	855
Oromiya	313,930	25,400	1,489,767	1,829,097	77,373
SNNPR	797,700	-	202,500	1,000,200	37,216
Somali	689,805	-	35,400	725,205	30,882
Tigray	24,560	184,100	628,240	836,900	37,619
Total	2,479,195	595,200	3,208,557	6,282,952	245,114

While general distribution if adequate and timely should prevent the situation from deteriorating, experience in Ethiopia has shown as recently as 1999/2000 that a crisis of this magnitude can require more intense supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes. At present, there is already evidence of unacceptable levels of moderate and severe malnutrition in the country. The percentage of children malnourished in some selected surveyed areas is indicated below.

**Table 4. Results of Nutritional Surveys Conducted between July and September 2002**

Location	Moderate Malnutrition	Severe Malnutrition	Agency
Zone 3, Afar	17.9%	2.8%	GOAL
Zone 5, Afar	24.6% - 29.9%	3.0%-5.5%	WVI
South Gonder, Amhara	13.0%	0.8%	SCUK
South Wollo, Amhara	17.8%	1.9%	Concern
East Shewa in Oromiya,	12.5%	1.5%	Goal
Damot Woide, SNNPR	7.2%	0.8%	Concern

Considering the results of the above surveys, looking forward to the results of the surveys in process or planned for the near future in East and West Hararghe and also based on experience of similar food crises in Ethiopia in the past, requirements for potential intense supplementary and therapeutic programmes should be considered.

As it is indicated in table 5, supplementary food assistance is requested for a total of 1.6 million people (35% of the needy population) who are vulnerable to severe malnutrition, including pregnant and lactating women, children under-five years and the elderly. This need is calculated based on the prioritization of woredas according to their degree of affectedness. Assessment teams prioritised woredas in three categories depending the severity of the problem. The first two priority woredas will be at risk of: 1) mortality, 2) malnutrition or 3) employing negative coping

mechanisms such as out migration, sale of productive assets, etc unless continuous and adequate relief food distribution is underway.

**Table 5. Immediate Supplementary Food Needs from October to December 2002**

Region	Vulnerable Groups	CSB Mt (4.5kg ration)	Veg Oil Mt (1.5kg ration)	Total Mt
Afar	172,813	1,333	778	3,111
Amhara	352,678	4,761	1,587	6,348
B Gumuz	-	-	-	-
Dire Daw	18,760	253	84	337
Gambella	-	-	-	-
Harari	6,650	-90	30	120
Oromiya	572,527	7,729	2,576	10,305
SNNPR	238,770	3,223	1,074	4,297
Somali	72,328	976	325	1,301
Tigray	116,375	1,571	524	2,095
Total	1,550,899	20,937	6,978	27,914

If general and targeted supplementary interventions do not succeed in preventing deterioration in nutritional status, more intense interventions may be necessary. While it is difficult to estimate what the needs will be at this stage, the requirements for BP-5 compact food for moderately malnourished children, sugar and therapeutic diet for the severely malnourished, and medical supplies and technical support where there is a need by Ministry of Health should be considered.

#### **4. Scenarios of Likely Emergency Needs in 2003**

Beneficiary figures normally decline with the *Meher* harvest, with the exception of pastoralists and *Belg* dependent farmers. However, given not only relatively high numbers of these groups (1.3 million) but also the fact that large numbers of people (approximately 3.7 million) will not benefit from a harvest at all this year, particularly in the eastern lowlands, at the beginning of the year 2003 numbers will inevitably start high.

While it is difficult to project the exact number of beneficiaries at this time for 2003, the teams attempted to forecast needs given three scenarios (best, mid and worst case).

In the best-case scenario, the *Kiremt* rains will cease beginning the end of September in the north and gradually withdraw until end of October in the south, beyond their normal cessation date. The harvest of short cycle crops in the north, east and south, as well as the normal harvest in the west for November/December would produce good yields. Unfortunately, the previous failure of long cycle crops will have reduced the national agriculture output. Under this best-case scenario, the assessment teams forecasted 6.8 million beneficiaries.

In the mid-case scenario, the *Kiremt* rains will stop at their normal cessation time (early September in the north and withdrawing in late September in the south). The expected harvest of short cycle crops in the north, east and south and the harvest in the west would provide average yields. The assessment teams forecasted 10.2 million beneficiaries.

In the worst-case scenario, the *Kiremt* rains will have stopped earlier than normal. Fortunately, for the north, this has proven not to be the case as rains continued until mid September. However for the south, cessation in late September or early October could still prove disastrous, particularly for harvests expected in November/December. The harvests of short-cycle crops in the north, east and south would be poor while the harvest in the west would be mediocre. The multi-agency

assessment teams forecasted 13.4 million beneficiaries. However, due to time constraints, the assessment team that went to Tigray did not cover all affected woredas in the Region. As a result of this incomplete assessment, the Region has conducted a follow-up assessment and came up with an additional 900,000 beneficiaries bringing the total needy population to 14.3 million. It should be noted, however, that , these figures are contingency planning scenarios. It will be further refined and confirmed by the up coming multi-agency rapid and final harvest assessments which will be undertaken in October and December, complemented by the MoA/FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission.

It is important to remember that these are contingency planning scenarios. In an effort to avoid a crisis precipitated by a potential lack of resources in early 2003, it is important to sensitise stakeholders as to the potential requirements for next year with an emphasis on the first three months. .

**Tables 6. Scenarios of the Likely Emergency Needs in 2003**

***A. Best case scenario***

Region	General Ration		Supplementary Ration		
	Beneficiaries	Cereals (MT)	Vulnerable Groups	Veg Oil (MT)	CSB (MT)
Affar	496,810	72,650	174,000	2,543	7,628
Amhara	1,516,200	147,756	419,305	4,421	13,293
Dire Dawa	21,000	2,835	7,350	99	298
Harari	15,000	2,025	5,250	71	213
Oromiya	2,252,700	322,169	691,355	10,187	30,562
SNNPR	720,000	56,880	197,785	1,393	4,178
Somali	725,200	100,106	71,200	1,175	3,525
Tigray	1,081,700	146,030	120,300	1,622	4,866
Gambela	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,828,610</b>	<b>850,450</b>	<b>1,686,545</b>	<b>21,521</b>	<b>64,563</b>

***B. Mid Case Scenario***

Region	General Ration		Supplementary Ration		
	Beneficiaries	Cereals (MT)	Vulnerable Groups	Veg Oil (MT)	CSB (MT)
Affar	621,000	90,830	217,400	9,537	3,179
Amhara	3,300,100	382,797	906,575	33,842	11,281
Dire Dawa	67,000	9,045	23,500	950	313
Harari	17,000	2,295	6,000	241	80
Oromiya	2,578,600	366,429	785,500	34,564	11,521
SNNPR	946,800	96,696	252,300	7,421	2,474
Somali	906,500	125,115	89,000	4,406	1,469
Tigray	1,756,500	263,475	212,800	9,576	3,192
Gambela	50,000	4,500	-	-	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,243,500</b>	<b>1,341,182</b>	<b>2,493,075</b>	<b>100,537</b>	<b>33,509</b>

### C. Worst Case Scenario

Region	General Ration		Supplementary Ration		
	Beneficiaries	Cereals (MT)	Vulnerable Groups	Veg Oil (MT)	CSB (MT)
Affar	776,400	113,556	271,700	3,974	11,923
Amhara	4,693,600	684,275	1,063,800	16,315	48,946
Dire Dawa	81,000	12,150	28,400	425	1,276
Harari	20,000	3,000	7,000	105	315
Oromiya	4,228,100	566,129	1,077,000	15,579	46,738
SNNPR	1,504,800	154,580	409,000	4,005	12,014
Somali	1,133,100	156,429	111,200	1,836	5,507
Tigray	1,756,500	289,823	212,800	3,511	10,534
Gambela	100,000	12,000	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>14,293,500</b>	<b>1,991,940</b>	<b>3,180,900</b>	<b>45,751</b>	<b>137,253</b>

## 5. Contingency Stocks, Strategies and Implementation Modalities

### 5.1 Coordination

Coordination for the 2002 drought and interventions through the end of this year and throughout 2003 will rely on a number of established coordination mechanisms, some of which have been in existence for a decade and others that have been more recently adopted as a response to the drought.

The Federal Government was the first to initiate a broad and coordinated approach to the crisis in its early stages. When the first information received highlighted a tragic situation in Afar Region, Shinile and Fik Zones in Somali Region, the National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee (NDPPC) dispatched eight multi-disciplinary teams to those areas, five to Afar Region and two to Shinile and one to Fik in Somali Region. Information is received at the DPPC on a daily basis from those teams comprising representation from the DPPC, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture and/or Ministry of Water Resources. With awareness of the scale and magnitude of the drought growing, the NDPPC also arranged for six additional teams with similar composition and responsibility to monitor and report on the situation in Tigray, Southern Nations, Amhara, Somali and Oromiya Regions. This information serves as the basis for decisions on allocations of assistance and prioritization of response. Members of the NDPPC established Emergency Coordination Task Forces (ECTF) in their respective sectors with participation from NGOs and UN agencies. These Task Forces report weekly to the Crisis Management Committee, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner of the DPPC.

To include a broader participation and enhance information exchange, a fortnightly Technical Information Management Exchange (TIME) forum has been established. Reports are given by representatives of the respective ECTFs and the DPPC. This is followed by frank and open discussions on the situation in affected areas of the country. The information gathered is then synthesized and presented in a report format. To ensure the awareness of donors, the Commissioner of the DPPC will also chair a monthly donors meeting and provide them with a broad overview of the evolving situation and open the discussion to questions that can be raised by all participants crossing all emergency sectors. As much of the information sharing at this level has been done through the Special Alert launched in July and non-food and food appeals from September to early October, the first of these meetings will be called at an appropriate time subsequent to the 7 October launch of the food appeal for October-December 2002 and forecast of food needs for 2003.

As a support to Government efforts, the NGO and UN communities have enhanced their own in-house coordination efforts using the Christian Relief and Development Association umbrella organization for many NGOs and individual efforts from prominent members of that community. On the UN side of things, there are regular Disaster Management Team and Strategic Disaster Management Team meetings with representation from the whole of the UN Country Team in Ethiopia and Emergency Officers Meetings held twice weekly.

## **5.2 Emergency Food Security Reserve (EFSR)**

The Reserve holds stocks of grain that can be made available against a written guarantee from concerned donors for repayment. This expedites distributions for in-kind contributions, international purchases and local purchases. In 2002, the EFSR level has reached a level near its long-term target of around 400,000 metric tons. However, with many loans taken out in the second half of the year, the physical stocks have been reduced significantly from the level of 350,000 metric tons in January. The physical stock as at 26<sup>th</sup> September 2002 was 122,841 tons. Scheduled repayments will bring physical stocks to nearly 281,000 tons by the end of the year, with outstanding loans of around 158,000 metric tons to be repaid. However, the size of the reserve could be below its minimum level by the end of the year. New loans against the current pledges of 100,000 and 5000 tons of US and China Governments respectively and other new donor contributions are expected between October and December. In view of this quick loan repayments are important.

**Table 7. Status of Ethiopian Food Security Reserve (EFSR) Physical Stock**

Month	EFSR physical Stocks at the beginning of the month (Tons)	Total Repayments (tons)	EFSR physical stocks at end of the month (Tons)
As at 26 <sup>th</sup> , September 2002	122,841	-	122,841
October 2002	122,841	68,927	191,768
November 2002	191,768	65,610	257,378
December 2002	257,378	23,400	280,778

(source: EFSR)

## **5.3 Logistics**

### **5.3.1 Vessel Planning, Berthing and Discharge**

Djibouti is currently the main port being used for delivery of relief food to the country. Taking into account port capacity and programming needs, vessel arrivals are appropriately scheduled. Coordination between relief agencies and port authorities remains good, with vessels receiving prompt berthing on arrival. Systems for processing shipping and customs, tax/duty exemptions in Ethiopia and within Djibouti are well established with no avoidable delays experienced. Using three berths, Djibouti port can accommodate three large-sized bulk vessels at the same time.

Adequate space quayside allows for sufficient marshalling area for shunting trucks and for an optimum number of bagging machines to operate. Vessel charter parties indicate average discharge rates are 2,400 tons/day; however, discharge rates have been shown to increase to 3,500 tons/day recently with exceptional performance peaking at 5000 tons/day. In the 2000 emergency, while the country was confronted massive emergency operation and other major problems with the neighboring country, Eritrea, the port demonstrated the ability to handle between 86,000 and 126,000 tons of bulk cargo per month. Almost all emergency, commercial and other import and export goods of the country delivered through the port of Djibouti.

### **5.3.2 Alternate Routes into Ethiopia<sup>1</sup>:**

If food arrivals at Djibouti exceed 126,000 tons per month over a four months period, there would be capacity limitations leading to possible use of alternate use of import corridors. The use of Berbera port in Somalia for delivery into Ethiopia is a viable option. Using Berbera port involves a 250-km road link to the Ethiopia border at Togowuchale, followed by a 64 km section to Jijiga. Deliveries can be made up to Dire Dawa. With regular maintenance of the road, up to 30,000 tons of food per month can be routed through this corridor targeted for distribution within the Somali region of Ethiopia.

### **5.3.3 Port Warehousing**

Whereas it is always the intention to discharge direct from vessels onto trucks, some agencies maintain storage capacity inside the port (for example WFP has 11,000 tons of storage at port). An additional 16,000 tons of warehouse capacity can be commercially leased outside the port area. This warehouse capacity ensures that vessels can continue to be discharged even when there are occasional problems with shortages of trucks and/or blockages on the Djibouti/Ethiopia road.

### **5.3.4 Overland Transport**

The World Bank supported reconstruction of the 188 km road from Djibouti to the Ethiopian Border is on-going. Available transporters have a combined uplift capacity of over 50,000 tons, In addition, the railway offers up to 4,000 tons of capacity per month for delivery to two locations in Ethiopia. Well-proven coordination and control systems have been established for; (a) mobilizing transporters and ensuring that vessels are discharged directly onto trucks, (b) monitoring truck transit times to destinations and their prompt return to Djibouti for subsequent loads when required, (c) coordinating with receiving locations on prompt offloading of the cargo.

### **5.3.5 Inland Warehousing, Transport & Distribution**

Emergency relief food is received directly by DPPC and NGOs or by the EFSRA as repayments for loans. With up to 350,000 tons of storage capacity available at strategic locations in the country, DPPC and the EFSRA have adequate warehouse space to receive and promptly offload relief cargo. Where required, DPPC can lease additional commercial storage.

## **5.4 Food Security Activities**

The pressure for emergency distributions should not obscure the opportunity to support the affected populations with relief resources in the most constructive means possible. The strategies that were set out in the "Assistance Requirements and Implementation Strategy: 2000" issued by the DPPC in January are still relevant and should be pursued further in 2003.

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<sup>1</sup> Port Sudan can also be considered as a third option and used for delivery of emergency items to the northern parts of the country. The road section beyond within Ethiopia to Gonder may be used during the dry period of October to May. The road becomes unusable to trucks during the rainy season.

## **5.5 Employment Generation Schemes (EGS)**

There is potential to address the needs that are predictable and chronic in nature through provision of different safety net options. However, the Employment Generation Schemes (EGS) activities are ongoing and have much potential for both current and future operations.

Employment Generation Schemes (EGS) combine relief resources with available labour to create useful household and community assets, contributing to reducing Ethiopia's chronic food insecurity. In many areas, a successful contribution has been made to soil and water conservation, rural road rehabilitation and other efforts that build community assets, while providing employment for disaster-affected people who receive their relief needs as food. The DPPC 2002 Annual Requirements and Assistance Strategy explicitly recognizes the importance of adequate local capacity for EGS implementation, directing that EGS should only be implemented if capacity exists for support and supervision.

For the more sophisticated EGS activities, as well as the guarantee of food, there are needs for training, technical expertise for planning/monitoring, equipment and operating costs. As such capacity exists only in a limited number of districts, capacity building for other districts is needed.

For most areas of the country, activities are undertaken best during the period after the main harvest and before land preparation for the next main harvest (i.e. between January and April). Thus the availability of resources early in the year assists implementation of EGS. While employment generation schemes will be used to the extent possible, many people identified for food assistance will still be reached through general ("gratuitous") relief distributions.